Mr. Duntov was assigned to the Corvette in 1955, and immediately set about to dramatically upgrade performance of the V8 version, introduced that year. While there have been many Duntov-inspired developments, the most well known in those early years was the first "Duntov" cam, which added over 30 horsepower to the sedate 265ci V8. Engine and chassis sophistication accelerated rapidly due to Mr. Duntov's influence, being evident in the high-performance 1957 model.

Shortly after going to work for Chevrolet, Zora set the tone for what he was about to accomplish in a memo to his bosses. The document, entitled, "Thoughts Pertaining to Youth, Hot Rodders and Chevrolet", laid the foundation for the strategy that Chevrolet has used ever since to create one of the most successful performance parts programs in the industry. Chevrolet quickly became one of the most successful manufacturers ever in the history of motor racing.

Soon, Zora became director of high performance at Chevrolet and helped to transform GM's largest division from a conservative company into a youthful, exciting one. In the process, he would change the Corvette from a docile roadster into a full-blown sports car that measured up on and off the racetrack against the likes of Porsche, Ferrari, Maserati, and Mercedes.

As was his way, Zora led by example. After helping to introduce the small-block V8 engine to the Corvette in 1955, providing the car with the much needed grunt, he set about showcasing the engine by charging up treacherous Pikes Peak in 1956 in a pre-production prototype Chevy and setting a stock car record. Not satisfied, he took a Corvette to Daytona Beach the same year and hit a record setting 150 mph over the flying mile. In his spare time, the brilliant and vocal GM driver/engineer also developed the famous Duntov high-lift camshaft and helped bring fuel injection to the Corvette in 1957.

"To establish the sports car, you have to race it," said Zora Arkus-Duntov, acknowledged as the person most responsible for making the Corvette a respected sports car worldwide.

The racing focus of Mr. Duntov's work on the Corvette accelerated with the SS project, this car running 155 mph at the opening of the new Daytona International Speedway in 1959 (the first car to officially circle the track.) That same year Duntov was named director of high performance vehicles, which allowed him to focus even more attention on racing (despite the AMA ban) and begin work on engine and chassis development of the now legendary Grand Sport.

In 1963, Zora launched the Grand Sport program. The original idea captured the interest and imagination of Corvette fans all over the world. The idea was to create a special lightweight Corvette weighing only 1,800 pounds and race it on an international circuit against not only Cobras and other GT-Class cars, but also racing only prototypes from Ferrari, Ford and Porsche. Power for the Grand Sport was to come from an aluminum version of the small block V8, equipped with special twin-plug cylinder heads. At 377ci, output was a projected 550hp at 6,400 rpm. But as it had so often, GM policy prohibited Zora from going racing, but not before five Grand Sports were built. The five Grand Sports eventually fell into the hands of private owners, and Zora somehow found a way to support them in spite of the official ban.

"For the first time," said Mr. Duntov, in reference to the 1963 Sting Ray, "I have a Corvette I can be proud to drive in Europe." Essentially, Duntov's 1963 Sting Ray chassis evolved from work begun as early as 1959 on the Grand Sport concept. From that point forward, the Corvette matured as a world-class sports car.

Zora Arkus-Duntov retired from GM in 1974, turning the reins over to Dave McLellan, but his impact on engineering and design had tremendous momentum. As an example, production of his '63 Sting Ray chassis design continued through the 1982 model year. Mr. Duntov's vision and energy brought the Corvette exitement to life, in what continues today as the only true production American sports car.

DECEMBER 1953 - ONE MAN'S THINKING ALOUD ON THE SUBJECT

"The hot rod movement and interest in things connected with hop-up and speed is still growing. As an indication, the publications devoted to hot rodding and hop-upping, of which some half dozen have a very large circulation and are distributed nationally, did not exist some six years ago.

"Should we consider that it would be desirable to make these youths Chevrolet-minded? I think that we are in a position to carry out [a] successful attempt. However, there are many factors against us.

"From cover to cover they are full of Fords. This is not surprising then that the majority of hot rodders are eating, sleeping, and dreaming of modified Fords.

"When a superior line of GM V-8s appeared, there were remarkably few attempts to develop these and none too successful. In the non acceptance of GM's V-8s, cost must have played a part.

"Like all people, hot rodders are attracted by novelty. However, better experience taught them that new development is costly and long, and therefore [they] are extremely conservative. From my observation, it takes an advanced hot rodder some three years to stumble toward the successful development of a new design. Overhead Fords will be in [this] state in 1956-57.

"The slide rule potential of our RPO V-8 engine is extremely high, but to let things run their natural course will put us one year behind and then not too many will pick up a Chevrolet for development.

"It seems that unless by some action the odds and the time factor are not overcome, Ford will continue to dominate the thinking of this group. One factor which can largely overcome the handicap would be the availability of ready-engineered parts for high output.

"If the use of the Chevrolet engine will be made easy and the very first attempts will be crowned with success, the appeal of the new will take hold, [and] a swing to Chevrolet may be anticipated. This means the development of a range of special parts -camshafts, valves, springs, manifolds, pistons, and such which will be made available to the public.

"The association of Chevrolet with hot rods, speeds, and such is probably inadmissible, but possibly the existence of the Corvette provides the loop hole. If the special parts are carried as RPO items for the Corvette, they undoubtedly will be recognized by the hot rodders as the very parts they were looking for.

"If it is desirable or not to associate the Corvette with speed, I am not qualified to say, but I do know that in 1954, sport car enthusiasts will get hold of Corvette and race it.

"In 1955, with the V-8 engine, if unaided, they will still be outclassed. The market-wise negligible number of cars purchased for competition attracts public attention and publicity out of proportion to their number. Since we cannot prevent the people from racing Corvettes, maybe it is better to help them to do a good job at it.

"To make good in this field, the RPO parts must pertain not only to the engine but to the chassis components, as well. Engineering-wise, development of these RPO items, as far as the chassis is concerned, does not fall out of line with some of the planned activity of our group. Use of light alloys, brake development-composite drums, discs, and such, are on the agenda of the Research and Development group already.

"The thoughts are offered for what they are worth - one man's thinking aloud on the subject."

THE LETTER THAT SAVED THE CORVETTE

TO: Mesars. E. N. Cole and M. Olley
FROM: Mr. Z. Arkus-Duntov, Research & Development Section
SUBJECT: Corvette
DATE: October 15, 1954

In this note, I am speaking out of turn. I am giving options and suggestions without knowing all the factors. I realize this but still am offering my thoughts for what they are. In order to make the content clear and short, I will not use the polite apologetic phrasing and say, "it is" instead of "it possibly might be" - and I apologise for this now.

By the looks of it, the Corvette is on its way out.

I would like to say the following: Dropping the car now will have adverse effect internally and externally.

It is admission of failure. Failure of aggressive thinking in the eyes of the organization, failure to develop a saleable product in the eyes of the outside world.

Above-said can be dismissed as sentimentality. Let's see if it can hurt the cash register. I think it can.

Ford enters the field with the Thunderbird, a car of the same class as the Corvette.

If Ford makes success where we failed, it may hurt.

With aggressiveness of Ford publicity, they may turn the fact to their advantage. I don't mean in terms of Thunderbird sales, but in terms of promotion of theirs and depreciation of our general lines.

We will leave an opening in which they can hit at will. "Ford out-engineered, outsold, or ran Chevrolet's pride and joy off the market". Maybe the idea is far-fetched. I can only gauge in terms of my own reactions or actions. In the bare-fisted fight we are in now, I would hit at any opening I could find and the situation where Ford enters and where Chevrolet retreats, it is not an opening, it is a hole!

Now if they can hurt us, then we can hurt them! We are one year ahead and we possibly learned some lessons which Ford has yet to learn.

Is the effort worthwhile? This, I am in no positon to say. Obviously, in terms of direct sales a car for the discriminating low volume market is hardly an efficient investment of efforts. The value must be gauged by effects it may have on an overall picture.

The Corvette failed because it did not meet GM standards of a product. It did not have the value for the money.

If the value of a car consists of practical values and emotional appeal, the sports car has very little of the first and consequently has to have an exaggerated amount of the second. If a passenger car must have an appeal, nothing short of a mating call will extract $4,000 for a small two-seater. The Corvette as it was offered had curtailed practical value being a poor performer. With a 6-cylinder engine, it was no better than the medium priced family car.

Timing was also unfortunate. When the novelty appeal was the highest, we hadn't had the cars to sell. When the cars became available, hypnotized by the initial overwhelming response, no promotional effort was made.

The little promotion which was made was designed to depreciate the car rather than enhance it. Hundreds or possibly thousands of dollars contained in the price of a sports or luxury car are paid for exclusivity. What did our promotion say on the radio and advertised in magazines? "Now everybody can have it! Come and get it". What virtues did advertising extoll? Only X inches high, only X inches long, etc. In the country, in which bigger is synonymous with better, and we really know it, we were trying to sell a car, because it is small! Crosley is smaller...

Were there no virtues to talk about? Quite some, but a condensation of best reports which appeared in motoring press previously had more glow and enthusiasm than our advertising.

Summarizing, the promotion was uninspired and half hearted attempt with no evidence of thought or enthusiasm.

Where do we stand now?

The Corvette still has the best and raciest look of all the sports cars, the Thunderbird included. performance is far superior to all the passenger cars and to 99% of the sports cars used on the road. It has flow in respect to passenger protection. Water leaks and cumbersome top and side window. With these minor flaws removed, we have a sports car with as much practical value as the sports care can have.

The borderline between the value and lack of same is not the absolute performance but comparative one. "My car can go X miles per hour does not mean as much as "My car can trim anything on wheels". The '55 Corvette will have this pride attached to its ownership. To be a success, it will need more emotional appeal which can be provided by promotion which will fit the product and inflame the type of customers which can buy the car.

As I see it and put it down, the Corvette is a product different from a passenger automobile having in every phase of operation problems of its own. With sales potential between 3 and at the most 10,000 cars a year, it is bound to be a hindering step-child in an organization which acts and thinks in terms of 1,500,000 units. A subdivision, section, department or what not, but an organization no matter how small but which is directly responsible for the successes of operation is necessary.

An organization which will eat and sleep Corvette as our divisions are eating and sleeping their particular cars.

I am convinced that a group with concentrated objective will not only stand a chance to achieve the desired result, but devise ways and means to make the operation profitable in a direct business sense.

ZORA ARKUS-DUNTOV
December 25, 1909 - April 21, 1996